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LABOUR MARKET POLICY AND THE REALLOCATION
OF LABOUR ACROSS SECTORS
R.  JACKMAN and C.  PAUNA
INTRODUCTION
This paper is concerned with the process of reallocation of labour
across broad industrial sectors. There are two main reasons for being
particularly interested in this issue. First, one of the most conspicuous
features of the pre-reform labour market of the formerly socialist
economies, as compared to that of market economies, is the very
different structure of employment across broad industrial sectors. The
large-scale movement of labour from agriculture and manufacturing
industry into the service sector is evidently one of the major tasks of
economic restructuring.
Second, the reallocation of labour is a task that must fall upon the
“external” labour market. It can be achieved only by the physical
mobility of workers who leave one enterprise and find work in another.
It is thus the dimension of restructuring in which any deficiencies in the
workings of the labour market, such as impediments to labour mobility
or poorly developed employment exchanges, are likely to have the
most severe effect. By contrast, at least part, and possibly a large part,
of the adjustment to new technology or commercial business practices
involves restructuring within the enterprise, in the sense of introducing
new working practices or organisational structures within firms and it
is in this context that issues of corporate governance, privatisation,
capital markets and the like are critical.
To what extent have the economies of Central and Eastern
Europe succeeded in reallocating labour towards sectors where it is
more productive? Can one assess the efficiency of their labour markets
in achieving such reallocation? What explains differences between
countries, and what policies can now help in this process? Do high
rates of unemployment assist or hinder labour market reallocation? Has
the Czech Republic maintained low unemployment by delaying
2economic restructuring, or has it been able to combine full employment
and labour market reallocation, and if so, how? In this paper we
attempt answers to these questions.
Our main conclusions are first that the labour market of most of
the transition economies have been dominated by economy-wide
shocks entailing employment decline in almost all sectors rather than
by reallocation across sectors. Even so, as the recovery gathers strength
reallocation is taking place and in this regard, up to half of the
reallocation that may be required in the lead economies (the Czech
Republic and Poland) has been achieved within the first five years of
the transition. This speed of reallocation compares well with that of
less developed market economies such as Greece or Portugal which are
adjusting to the European Single Market. Second, the effectiveness of
labour market reallocation appears to proceed as rapidly in
interventionist countries like the Czech Republic as in free market
countries like Poland. The Czech full employment “miracle” has not
been bought at the cost of a slower pace of restructuring.  
This paper is in four sections. The first attempts a measure of the
change in the structure of employment required and the amount so far
achieved. The second section identifies measures both of the speed and
the efficiency of restructuring, and the effectiveness of new job
creation. We argue that new job creation is the most important aspect
of restructuring and we show that this measure bears little relationship
to aggregate measures of economic performance, such as GDP growth
or unemployment. The third offers some thoughts on decision-making
within state-owned enterprises, where it is argued that the key to
understanding the disparate performance of the economies of Central
and Eastern Europe lies in the worker orientated management of the
SOEs. The final section looks at policy.
1.   THE REALLOCATION OF LABOUR ACROSS SECTORS
Despite the pivotal importance of the concept of restructuring in the
3economics of transition, there seem to have been few attempts to
measure it. In this paper, we attempt to quantify various measures of
restructuring, in the sense of labour reallocation, in order to answer the
following types of question:
C How much restructuring is required in each economy?
C How much restructuring has taken place since the reforms?
C How far has the restructuring been successful in reducing the
initial structural imbalance (i.e has it been in the right direction,
or “convergent”)?
C Is the pace of restructuring fast or slow by comparison with the
current pace of employment reallocation in market economies?
C Is high unemployment correlated with faster, or better directed,
restructuring? 
Some models of labour market reallocation have been formulated
in terms of ownership. Perhaps most influential have been models
developed by Blanchard (1991) and Aghion and Blanchard (1994).
Their basic paradigm envisaged three stages in the transition. The initial
stage would be characterised by a sharp fall in state sector employment
and a sharp rise in unemployment. In the second stage, the growth of
private sector firms would draw workers from the pool of
unemployment. Unemployment would decline until it reached an
equilibrium level, after which, in the third stage, further growth in the
private sector would depend on private firms being able to bid away
workers from the residual state sector. Some economists went as far as
to argue that unemployment could be regarded as an “indicator of the
extent to which the restructuring process has got under way”
(McAuley, 1991). 
We would argue that it is misleading to identify labour market
4reallocation with the development of private ownership. Employment
in the private sector can grow simply because enterprises are privatised
with no change in any worker’s place of employment. Such
privatisation may raise efficiency but in general will not remove the
need to shed labour from the formerly state-owned manufacturing
enterprises. In the context of the labour market, restructuring is more
fundamentally an issue of industrial composition. A shift out of
agriculture, for example, is needed in most transitional economies
whether or not agriculture was initially in state or private ownership.
Likewise, one can expect a substantial expansion of employment in
activities such as airports or telecommunications, whether or not state
owned. Of course, the change in industrial composition will in general
be associated with a decline in the state sector (manufacturing) and
growth in the private sector (services), but it is the sectoral rather than
the ownership shift which necessitates labour reallocation.
This is not to rule out the need for labour mobility between
enterprises within the same sector. Differences in management qualities,
market access or product mix may allow some enterprises to flourish
while others in the same sector decline, and, even within narrowly
defined sectors, state firms may be losing out to de novo private
activity. Nonetheless, in this paper we will focus on labour mobility
across broadly defined (1-digit) industrial sectors, because this is where
problems of structural adjustment can be expected to be most severe.
In industrialised market economies there is considerable labour
mobility within sectors, but there are much larger problems associated
with de-industrialisation and the absorption of manufacturing workers
into other sectors. Similarly, prior to the reforms, inter-enterprise
labour mobility was quite high in Eastern Europe and of the same order
of magnitude as in many Western European countries (Jackman and
Rutkowski, 1994, Table 7.1). But in the past the bulk of this mobility
took the form of people moving between basically similar jobs in
similar types of enterprise, and even if job mobility of this form were to
remain high, as appears to be the case in Russia and elsewhere in the
former FSU (see e.g. Commander et al, 1995), it would make no
5contribution to bringing about the enormous changes in the broad
structure of employment that are required. 
A second reason for looking at broad industrial sectors concerns
the need to distinguish restructuring — which implies change from a
less to a more efficient allocation of resources — from simple
turbulence, or change in no particular direction. We need to ask
whether labour reallocation is moving people to where they are likely
to be more productive, and this requires a view of what structure is the
ultimate objective. How might one determine a “warranted” or
“terminal” employment structure for each country, that is to say the
structure that could be expected to develop in the long term given
current policies, the “long term” being perhaps a period of time over
which the workforce and the built environment are taken as given, but
the labour allocation and investment adjust fully to the new regime. 
Estimates of the  comparative advantage of individual countries
in particular sectors (e.g. Hare and Hughes, 1992) typically build in
features of the economy, such as the inherited capital stock, which will
themselves change during the process of transition. Additionally, they
are more feasible for traded goods sectors than for (private or public)
services, though the bulk of employment in an efficient allocation is
likely to be in the service sector. 
Instead, we start from the idea that, to a first approximation, the
structure of employment in the Central and Eastern European (CEE)
countries should in the long run become more or less the same as in
neighbouring market economies. The differences in the inherited
employment structure of the CEE economies as compared to a
neighbouring market economy can be attributed to the distortions of
the planned economy, reflecting the material bias of production,
obsolete technology and inappropriate relative factor prices. As these
features are removed, the employment structure of CEE countries
should come to resemble that of Western European market economies.
One advantage of a direct comparison with a market economy
unadjusted for the specific features of the transition economies is that
it avoids the need for reliable data on output or the capital stock. Time
6inconsistent and error-infested statistical measures of output or capital
stock are a major impediment to any empirical investigation of the
economic reform in Eastern Europe, particularly when attempting inter
temporal and cross-country comparisons. For historical reasons, labour
market data in the former socialist countries tend to be more reliable
than other types of quantitative information.
In Table 1, using OECD data which permit direct comparison by
broad industrial sector, we document the employment structure of the
CEE countries in 1989 with that of Western European comparator
economies. For purposes of comparison, we divided Western European
countries into a Northern group (Denmark, (West) Germany,
Netherlands and UK) and Southern group (France, Greece, Italy and
Spain), to allow for the considerable differences in employment in
agriculture. 
The table indicates the scale of the problem. In comparison with
either group of market economies, there is obviously excessive
employment in agriculture, mining and manufacturing industry
everywhere. Services, particularly trade and finance (which covers
business and professional services in addition to banking, insurance
etc.) are underdeveloped in all countries. It is noticeable also that
“community services” (which include health and education as well as
public administration) employ fewer people than in the market
economies. On the other hand, employment in construction and
transport is much the same. 
It is evident from Table 1 that the extent (as against the nature) of
structural imbalance differs considerably between countries. In the final
rows of the Table, we calculate an “index of restructuring” which
measures the proportion of the workforce in each country which would
need to change sector to enable the country to attain the same structure
of employment as that of a comparable Western European economy,
as characterised by either the Northern or the Southern group, in 1989.
As compared with the structure of employment in the Southern
European countries, the extent of restructuring required in Romania,
at 31.3% of the workforce was, at the outset, nearly double that
7required in Hungary (16.5%). While Romania is something of an
outlier, the extent of restructuring required was also significantly
greater in Bulgaria and (because of its abnormally large agricultural
sector) in Poland than in the Czech or Slovak Republics, which are
quite similar to Hungary. To attain the same structure as the Northern
countries requires a further reallocation of about 3% in each of the
countries.
Turning now to the second question, the amount of restructuring
achieved, an obvious measure is simply to replicate Table 1 for a recent
year, say 1994, and compare the structural imbalances “now” with
those that existed at the outset. The data for such a comparison are
shown in Table 2. For various reasons, including German reunification,
it is not possible to obtain data on a comparable basis for the Northern
group of countries after 1989, so this comparison is undertaken with
regard to the Southern group only. This makes very little difference
since the direction of labour reallocation is the same on either basis in
almost all sectors in every country. The remarkable feature of Table 2
is that the imbalances appear as great now as they were in 1989. While
the proportion employed in manufacturing has fallen everywhere, and
the proportions employed in trade and finance risen, the proportion
employed in agriculture has risen in some of the countries, and, most
remarkably, the restructuring index shows very little improvement and
has actually slipped back in some countries. 
The apparent lack of progress in restructuring despite substantial
job losses reflects several phenomena. First, there is a problem of
“moving goalposts” — the market economies are themselves in the
process of relatively rapid structural change, and the transition
economies need quite a rapid pace of employment reallocation simply
to avoid falling further behind. (In all cases employment changes in
market economies are moving them further away from the employment
structure of the transition economies.) If one calculates the gap in
employment structure between the transition economies in 1994 and
the comparator economies in 1989, all the transition economies show
some improvement, most notably the Czech and Slovak Republics.
8Even on this measure, however, progress in Poland and Bulgaria has
been very limited and in Romania it has been almost non-existent.
     The second reason concerns the peculiar role of the agricultural
sector as an “employer of last resort”. In some countries, particularly
those where employment in agriculture was initially high, the collapse
of regular employment has led to a reversion to small-scale farming.
There is thus a perverse tendency for those countries which had the
greatest surplus of employment in agriculture in 1989 to experience the
slowest declines, or even in the case of Romania a sharp increase, in
agricultural employment between 1989 and 1992. We return to the
special character of agricultural employment in the next section.
Third, and most importantly, a significant part of the change in
the employment structure that has been observed has not been
attributable to the reallocation of labour across sectors, but simply
reflects the uneven incidence of macroeconomic recession. A sector
with excess employment at the outset may be shedding labour, but if
its rate of employment decline is slower than average, its share of
employment will be increasing. In Bulgaria, for example, the shares of
employment in mining, electricity, water and transport have all risen,
even though the initial shares in these sectors were already too high,
presumably because they are less vulnerable to recession.
Some further evidence for this last point is given in Tables A1 and
A2 of the Appendix, which show gross changes of employment by
sector between 1989 and 1992, and 1992 and 1994 respectively.
Between 1989 and 1992 the rate of job destruction ranged from 25.0%
in Bulgaria to 10.2% in the Czech Republic, while job creation ranged
from 6.7% in Romania to only 0.2% in Bulgaria. There is an clear
inverse relationship between job destruction and job creation measured
at the sectoral level, consistent with the dominant role of aggregate
shocks relative to sectoral reallocation. It is notable that in most cases
even where the share of employment in a particular sector is rising, the
absolute level of employment in that sector is falling. Such changes in
the structure of employment that took place between 1989 and 1992
were thus achieved almost entirely by differential rates of job loss with
9no need for labour mobility across sectors.
The later period, from 1992 to 1994, shows a reduced rate of job
destruction in all countries and a more rapid rate of job creation, and
no longer an inverse correlation between the two. By this stage there
is evidence of significant job creation, notably in Poland and the Czech
Republic, which have achieved relatively rapid rates of growth in the
business service sectors, that is trade and finance.
2. LABOUR REALLOCATION AND AGGREGATE
UNEMPLOYMENT
To assess the extent of effective labour reallocation across sectors it is
clearly necessary to look not at employment shares, but at the actual
numbers employed in different sectors. With employment falling by
15—20% in some countries, the immediate issue is how to treat the
emergence of unemployment. In large part this depends on whether
unemployment is regarded as temporary or permanent. To the extent
that the CEE countries are adopting policies and institutions similar to
those of Western European countries, they must presumably expect
rather similar unemployment rates in the long term. We therefore adopt
the principle of the comparator market economies as indicators of
likely long term unemployment rates.
It turns out, however, that average unemployment rates in CEE
countries are now much the same as in Western Europe. Thus we can
regard current CEE unemployment rates as perhaps close to their likely
long run equilibrium levels, at least in relation to western Europe as it
was at the end of the 1980s. We may then take the allocation of the
labour force in the comparator country, including the unemployment
rate, as the standard against which labour reallocation can be
measured. Thus for each CEE country we calculate, given the size of
its 1994 labour force, how many people would be employed in each
sector and how many would be unemployed if it were to have the same
structure of employment and the same unemployment rate as the
comparator Western European economy (as of 1989).
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 For this purpose we return to the Northern and Southern groups
of comparator market economies set out in Table 1. The differences
between these groups can be attributed in part to permanent features
of the economic landscape such as climate or population density. It is
conspicuous that in comparison with Northern Europe the CEE
imbalance is concentrated almost exclusively in agriculture, where the
CEE average of around 24% contrasts with only 4% in the Northern
European countries. It would seem appropriate to allow for persistent
differences along these lines in CEE countries also, and in the
comparisons that follow we use the Northern countries as the
comparator group for the Czech and Slovak republics and for Hungary
and the Southern countries as a comparator group for the others
(Poland, Bulgaria and Romania).
This provides a basis for comparing the actual changes in
employment, measured in terms of overall sectoral declines or
increases, with those which would be required for the structure of
employment to adjust to that of the comparator market economy.
The data and calculations for each of the CEE countries are
presented in Tables A3 — A8 in the Appendix. The first three columns
set out the data — actual employment and unemployment in 1989 and
1994 and the employment structure based on the comparator market
economy. The next two columns contrast the changes in employment
which have occurred with those which would have been required to
replicate the employment structure of the comparator economy. 
On this basis we may construct a measure which takes account
not only of the totality of sectoral employment changes, but also of the
direction of such changes. The “warranted” or “convergent” change in
employment (column 5) can then be compared with the actual change
in employment between 1989 and 1994 (column 4). Where the two
figures have the same sign, either positive or negative, we can measure
the amount of restructuring achieved by the smaller of the two. Where
the actual and convergent changes have opposite signs, no restructuring
is deemed to have taken place. Hence for each economy we can
compute the total extent of labour reallocation in the convergent
11
direction, that is restructuring achieved (column 6), as compared with
labour reallocation going in the “wrong” direction or overshooting the
adjustment required (column 7). 
These calculations permit a number of measures of the success of
labour reallocation. First we can ask what proportion of the labour
reallocation “required” has taken place in the first five years, which we
may measure as the absolute sum of the numbers in column 6 divided
by the absolute sum of those in column 5. This gives a measure of the
speed of restructuring. The results of these calculations are presented
in Table 3, which suggests that on average about 40% of the
employment changes to achieve convergence had already taken place
by 1994, with the highest figure being for Hungary (60%), and the
lowest for Romania.
It is also possible to derive a measure of the “efficiency” of labour
market reallocation, that is to say the proportion of the total
employment change that has been convergent towards the warranted
structure. This is measured by the absolute sum of the numbers in
column 6 as a proportion of the absolute sum of those in column 4. If
labour reallocation is costly, it is important to avoid unnecessary
structural change, and one may wish to balance these costs against the
costs of slower adjustment. In all countries over 60% of employment
changes have been convergent, with the Czech Republic achieving the
highest efficiency, over 90%, on this criterion.
By way of comparison, we have made similar calculations for two
relatively non-industrialised market economies in southern Europe,
Greece and Portugal, which have recently become members of the EU
and are now to some extent subject to the rigours of the European
Single Market. In terms of the speed of restructuring, Portugal has
achieved a more rapid change than any of the CEE countries while
Greece is at the lower end of the range. Similarly, Portugal does well
on the efficiency index while Greece is worse than any of the CEE
countries. The differences between these two countries, and the
differences amongst the CEE countries, are evidently larger than the
differences between the two groups. 
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The measure of restructuring we have adopted comprises two
qualitatively rather different activities: job losses in sectors with excess
employment and job creation in sectors with deficient employment. But
clearly, destroying redundant jobs, for all the social costs involved,
remains an economically easier task than creating new jobs. The
amount of new job creation required for convergence varies from over
24% of the labour force in Romania to about 16.5% in Poland and
Slovakia to 12.5% in Bulgaria, Hungary and the Czech Republic, the
low figure for Bulgaria being largely because of the sharp drop in its
labour force which permits a larger part of the restructuring process to
be achieved through differential job loss. 
In the final column of Table 3, we have calculated a new job
creation index, which is the number of new jobs created in the sectors
with deficient employment as a proportion of the total new job creation
required for convergence. On this measure, the Czech Republic is the
most successful of the transition economies, with 28% of new job
creation already achieved, followed by Poland, Slovakia and Hungary.
Bulgaria and Romania have made virtually no progress at all on this
definition. It is also noteworthy that on the basis of the new job
creation index, both Greece, and to an even greater extent Portugal, are
far ahead of any of the CEE countries.
The final question concerns the relationship between
restructuring and unemployment. Does unemployment assist the
process of restructuring? Clearly, the answer depends on the measure
chosen. We would argue that the objective of restructuring from a
labour market perspective is to create jobs in the growth potential
deficient employment sectors. It is a hypothesis that this process may
be assisted by a rapid rate of job destruction and transitional
unemployment, but job destruction and unemployment should not be
seen as policy objectives, but only as a means to an end, the objective
being new job creation. 
On this measure, as we have already noted, the Czech Republic
is the most successful of the CEE economies and this experience
appears to suggest that employment growth in private services may be
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assisted by a more gradual pace of job loss in the state sector. The next
most successful economy on this criteria, however, is Poland which, by
contrast, is an economy of high unemployment (in particular in relation
to its output growth). The relationship between unemployment and the
pace of job creation in the growing sectors is shown in Figure 1, which
suggests that there is no clearcut relationship, with the Czech Republic
a clear outlier.  
The explanation of the absence of any correlation between
restructuring and unemployment appears a relatively simple one,
namely that unemployment is not the route by which workers move
between sectors. The Hungarian Household Panel Survey (Kollo,
1993) found that most workers in private firms were recruited directly
from state firms, whilst a majority of the unemployed who found jobs
returned to state sector employers, and in fact more people entered
unemployment from the private sector than unemployed people found
work in the private sector. Similar results were found in the former
Czechoslovakia (Vercenik, 1992), in Poland (Boeri, 1993) and a survey
of recruitment by private sector firms in Bulgaria (Beleva et al, 1995)
found that virtually none hired unemployed people.
The evidence that growing firms recruit from those in work rather
than from the unemployed does not mean that there is no link between
unemployment and restructuring. If growing firms are recruiting from
the state sector the wage they will have to pay will obviously depend
on the wages paid in state firms, which in turn may be sensitive to the
unemployment rate.  However, in economies where flows out of
unemployment are low (Boeri, 1994), wage setting in firms would in
principle be much more sensitive to the income available to the
unemployed, in particular the level and duration of unemployment
benefit, than to the impact of changes in the unemployment rate on
their prospects of finding another job.  
The finding that unemployment is unnecessary for successful
restructuring, as measured in terms of labour mobility, raises two further
questions. First, if the Czech full employment achievement is not
accounted for by slow restructuring, how is it to be explained, and
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indeed what are the main causes of the very different evolution of
unemployment (both absolutely and relative to output) across
countries? Second, what policy actions can countries now take to
enable them to reduce unemployment without prejudicing the progress
of economic transition? 
3.   EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS OF STATE FIRMS
Given the dominant role of the collapse of output in the immediate
aftermath of the recession, it would be natural to presume that the
unemployment rate of an economy would be determined primarily by
the magnitude of the aggregate decline in output. But, as shown in
Table 4, there are in fact large and significant differences between
output and employment changes and between employment and
unemployment changes in the first years of transition. In some countries
the fall in output has been associated with much larger falls in
employment than in others. Given the initial concentration of output
and employment in state firms, it is in their behaviour that some
understanding of the differences in behaviour may be sought.
How might one model the wage and employment decisions of
worker or manager controlled enterprises subject to the disruptive
consequences of economic transition? We do not attempt a systematic
review of this issue, but instead focus on the critical question of when
an enterprise facing an adverse demand shock resorts to laying off
workers. We follow the standard presumption that, in the interval
between the collapse of central planning and the institution of private
ownership, the prime objective of the state-owned enterprise (SOE) has
been the welfare of its workforce. In attaining this objective, it is
important to recognise that the SOE can separate output and
employment decisions, and that the production function is not
necessarily a binding constraint. Price and output decisions are made to
maximise revenue in the product market subject to the constraint of
demand. Wage and employment decisions are then made in the interests
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of workers’ welfare, subject to the financial constraint. (For a model
developing this idea, see Jackman et al, 1992.) 
Some evidence in support of this interpretation is given in Table
5. Over the period 1990—93, the correlation between changes in output
and changes in employment across narrow (2-digit) sectors in
manufacturing in Poland is only 0.30. Notably, the correlation between
product price and output is negative, though again weak, while the
correlation between product price and the number of employees is
positive. Most strikingly, there is a much stronger correlation between
revenue and employment. All this appears consistent with the idea that
employment is determined by the number of workers firms can afford
to pay, rather than by their production requirements. 
Enterprises facing an adverse shock can then choose to reduce
production but maintain employment. In such an enterprise, worker
effort must necessarily fall in line with the fall in productivity, and if
there is no change in the relative product price the real consumption
wage must also fall in the same proportion. In Romania, for example,
survey evidence suggests that average hours worked have fallen from
around 2,100 a year in 1989 to only 1,500 a year in 1992. 
To explain differences in behaviour across countries, it is helpful
to envisage three stages of enterprise response to adverse shocks. First,
it may be able to protect both wages and employment in the face of
falling revenues by reducing other costs, by not replacing workers who
leave and taking advantage of any remaining softness in the budget
constraint. Second, it can maintain employment with lower work effort
and lower real wages. It will want to cut wages for so long as the wage
income it can pay exceeds the income its workers can get outside the
firm, i.e. primarily unemployment benefit. Only when other sources of
savings have been exhausted, and wages have been cut to the outside
opportunity, will it be forced into laying off workers. 
There is evidence that labour shedding in the first phase took the
form mainly of voluntary separations. This process takes various forms:
retirements and early retirements; in some countries emigration or
others wanting to leave the labour force; but above all workers leaving
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to take (what they hope will be) better jobs in the growing sectors of the
economy dominated by de novo private firms. A number of studies have
documented a rate of separation from state sector firms in the first few
years of the transition no higher than their normal levels prior to the
reforms (see, for example Beleva et al, 1995, for Bulgaria, or Earle and
Oprescu, 1995, for Romania). 
One of the most important differences between countries has been
the extent to which various forms of deficit finance have been allowed
to continue. Poland and Hungary have perhaps been least tolerant, as
was Bulgaria in the initial stages of the transition. The ending of the soft
budget constraint in these countries has forced a greater degree of
adjustment of wages and employment. In Romania, by contrast, much
of state owned industry, particularly heavy industry and mining,
continued to receive financial support. In the Czech Republic, selective
subsidy and other forms of directed support have permitted many state
enterprises to maintain employment despite being subject to major
demand shocks. 
Where SOEs are obliged to cut into their wage bills, and therefore
to reduce either wages or employment or both, the key issue is the
expected income of workers laid off from the enterprise. It has been
clear from an early stage that the labour market prospects of
unemployed workers were very weak. The alternative sources of income
for most workers consist largely of unemployment benefits, casual
informal work or the support of their families. Differences in
unemployment benefit regimes constitute a further element in
understanding the different experiences of the different countries. 
Unemployment benefit regimes in CEE countries appear at first
sight rather generous, with replacement rates as high as 75% in Hungary
and around 60% elsewhere. In fact, these ratios give a misleading
picture: benefits are often capped and their real value in some countries
is quickly eroded by inflation. Even more importantly, the duration of
benefit entitlement is limited to only six months in the Czech Republic
and typically about a year elsewhere (Boeri, 1994; Scarpetta and
Reutersward, 1994). In some of the countries, particularly Poland, the
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benefit regime was initially more lenient in terms of eligibility and
duration, and this allowed some unemployment and particularly long-
term unemployment to build up. One consequence has been that it has
become difficult for benefit officers to monitor the activities of the
unemployed so that it is, for example, common for unemployed people
to work in the informal sector.
It is perhaps the combination of hard budget constraints at the
level of the enterprise and a relatively generous stance on benefits in
Hungary and Poland which accounts for the willingness of enterprises
in these countries to lay off workers rather than cut wages. From the
perspective of a worker managed firm, unemployment benefits
reintroduce, at the level of the household, the soft budget constraint in
the sense of providing public financial support for the enterprise
conditional on making its workers unemployed. In the Czech Republic,
and to some extent also in Romania, a different policy stance, more
supportive of firms but tougher on unemployed people, has encouraged
enterprises to retain their workers. 
4.   POLICY
From the outset, labour market policy in the transition economies has
been based on the recognition of the need for substantial reallocation
of labour across sectors. It was thought that employment restructuring
might lead to high, albeit temporary, unemployment because the speed
of job loss in declining sectors could be expected to be very much more
rapid than the rate of new job creation in the growing sectors. Further,
the sectoral reallocation of labour could be impeded by various
obstacles to labour mobility, such as poorly developed employment
exchanges or the absence of an effective housing market. In this
framework, the key elements of labour market policy were seen to be (a)
subjecting firms to hard budget constraints to force rapid restructuring,
(b) encouraging labour mobility and wage flexibility and (c) provision
of benefits, or some form of “social safety net”, for those temporarily
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stranded between the collapse of jobs in the state sector and the growth
of the private sector.
We have argued that such a perspective may have been mistaken.
It is not in our view correct to think that unemployment in the transition
was an inevitable component of reallocation. The Czech Republic,
which has achieved the most rapid rate of new job creation in the
growth sectors (trade and finance), has the lowest unemployment rate
in Europe. Overall, our empirical work suggests that there is no
correlation between the rate of new job creation and the rate of decline
of employment in the sectors with excessive employment. The belief
that unemployment is needed in the particular circumstances of the
transition because it would facilitate the movement of workers into
growth sectors, seems to us mistaken — private firms appear to recruit
almost exclusively from those with jobs in the state sector or new
entrants to the labour force rather than from the unemployed.  
Thus we would question the rationale of policies directed at
speeding up the shake-out of labour from the excess employment
sectors. By creating open unemployment, such policies burden the
public finances and additionally may create problems of deterioration
of morale and work habits amongst those made unemployed. It remains
an option for state firms to maintain employment, and the extent to
which they exercise that option can be influenced by policy. What
principles ought then to guide policy?
Clearly the main objective must be to encourage the growth of the
new private sector. While high rates of unemployment do not of
themselves contribute to this objective, policy initiatives to reduce
unemployment could well be harmful to private sector employment. For
example, a policy of indefinite and indiscriminate support for
maintaining employment in declining firms financed by taxes on private
firms would have a severe adverse effect on the private sector. Rather
what is needed are policies to equate the private and social costs of
layoffs, as against the present situation where the state subsidises layoffs
but not employment.
One extreme would be simply to abolish unemployment benefits,
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as is approximately the case in Russia. The main effect of this policy has
been to bring about very sharp cuts in real wages in conjunction with
the maintenance of high levels of employment in state (or formerly
state) firms. Registered unemployment in Russia remains very low, and,
even on Labour Force Survey measures, the 1995 rate is below 8%.
Given a decline of output in Russia of close on 50% this is a remarkably
low number. But the consequence has been an enormous increase in
hardship, poverty and inequality in Russia to an extent which would be
unacceptable in most of Eastern Europe.
An alternative approach, for which the Czech experience offers
some support, is one based on restricting the availability of
unemployment benefits on some “workfare” principle. In such
programmes, the state provides income support in conjunction with
requiring unemployed people to undertake some publicly useful work.
Workfare not only diminishes the possible attractions of unemployment
particularly to those with informal sector opportunities or to the idle,
but also tends to encourage the unemployed to search more actively for
regular work. Hence it leads to lower wages being set in firms than if
unemployment benefits were set at the same level but with no work
obligation.
The balance of policies in the Czech Republic has involved a
relatively short duration of “unconditional” unemployment benefits,
followed after six months by a work guarantee programme on workfare
lines. By accompanying this policy with selective support of state firms,
the Czech Republic has achieved a better balance in terms of both
encouraging the growth of jobs in the private sector and restraining the
decline in employment in the state sector. (For more detailed evaluation
of the Czech experience, see Boeri and Burda, forthcoming; Ham et al,
1995.) This policy mix may offer a more attractive model for other CEE
countries.
Looking further into the nature of unemployment in the transition
economies, it is notable that both the eligibility and the duration of
unemployment benefits are limited, yet many people seem able to
support themselves for long periods of  unemployment. For example, in
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Bulgaria only 24% of those reported as unemployed in the June 1994
Labour Force Survey were receiving unemployment benefits, leaving
550,000 people (over 15% of the labour force) reporting themselves as
unemployed without benefits and in most cases without other forms of
state income support.
Clearly, it is possible that many of those registered as, or reporting
themselves, unemployed may also have some form of casual or informal
work, given in particular that many of the East European countries have
sizeable agricultural sectors, and some also have thriving informal
sectors. There has been widespread concern, not least in the countries
themselves, about abuse of the benefit system, though there is little hard
evidence. However, in Poland one survey found that 46% of
unemployed people had some form of work, albeit often only casual or
part-time (World Bank, 1995), while a second survey found that around
35% of employers were hiring informally people registered as
unemployed (Mroczkowski, 1996). Unemployment is thus becoming
linked to the growth of the (non-tax paying) shadow economy.
The transition economies typically have both high benefits, albeit
with restricted coverage, and high employment taxes, which together
create strong incentives for evasion. This suggests a possible new role
for active labour market policies: by linking payment of benefit to some
temporary job, the employer is of necessity brought into the formal
sector. Traditionally, evaluations of active labour market policies in
CEE countries, as in OECD economies, have tended to be
unfavourable, reflecting the fact that active policies are designed to
overcome impediments to mobility when the problem in most CEE
countries has been an overall shortage of jobs (OECD, forthcoming;
Puhani and Steiner, 1996). But these evaluations have been primarily
concerned with the future job prospects of participants rather than with
the growth of the shadow economy. A gradual introduction of workfare
style active labour policies, say in terms of providing a temporary job or
training after six months unemployment for those under 25, as a
condition for continued receipt of benefit could have an important role
in retaining people in the official labour market, and discouraging the
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growth of the shadow economy.
The main conclusion of this paper is that unemployment in the
transition economies has been neither necessary nor efficient from the
perspective of labour market restructuring. It has rather been the
consequence of misguided policies which have subsidised socially
inefficient job destruction. The outcome has been high and persistent
unemployment. Labour market policy is thus still required to restrain
the growth of wages, either through reducing unemployment benefits or
by combining benefits with workfare based active labour market
policies.
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DATA APPENDIX
SOURCES
i)    OECD employment by sector. The data is from OECD-Labour
Force Statistics (1993). The southern group of OECD countries
consists of France, Greece, Italy and Spain, the northern group consists
of Denmark, Germany (West), the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom. The figures for each group are weighted averages.               
ii)     Eastern European countries. The main data source is
Employment Observatory — Central and Eastern Europe No. 8, 1996,
(European Commission (DG V), Brussels), except for Romania, where
we use the Statistical Yearbook (1995) published by the Romanian
Commission for Statistics. These data derive primarily from
administrative sources, typically enterprise based Censuses,
supplemented by various ad hoc estimates of the private sector and,
since 1992 or 1993, by labour force surveys. Data is end year. Further
details for individual countries are as follows:
Bulgaria 
The primary sources of data for the whole period are the National
Statistical Institute and the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare. The
labour force and employment figures are administrative data derived
from establishment Censuses together with official estimates of
employment in the private sector. 
Czech Republic and Slovakia 
Up to and including 1992, the data are based on establishment surveys.
The figures are total number of jobs (i.e. multiple job holders are
counted more than once) and exclude apprentices and women on
maternity leave. After 1993, the data come from the Labour Force
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Survey which, however, adopts a broadly similar industrial
classification.
Hungary 
Up to 1991, the data are derived from the labour accounts of the
Central Statistical Office. From 1992, they come from the Labour Force
Survey, with broadly similar industrial classification. The
unemployment rate is the official one and includes women on maternity
leave.
Poland 
Data are from administrative records throughout plus sample surveys of
small enterprises conducted by the Central Statistical Office and also,
in the case of agriculture, from Census figures and the Labour Force
Survey.
Romania 
Data come from administrative sources of the National Commission for
Statistics. Figures include official estimates of employment in the private
sector.
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TABLE 1
Structure of employment (%) in 1989
Sector Bulgaria Czech Hungary Poland Romania Slovakia South
OECD
North
OECD
Agriculture 19.0 11.7 16.6 26.8 27.9 13.8 10.7 4.1
Mining 2.6 3.6 2.0 3.4 2.3 1.0 0.4 1.0
Manufacturing 34.9 34.0 28.6 24.5 33.0 32.1 22.0 26.3
Electricity, gas,
water
0.8 1.4 2.6 1.1 1.2 1.6 0.9 1.1
Construction 7.8 7.3 7.0 7.8 7.0 11.6 8.1 6.4
Trade 9.2 11.5 11.3 8.9 5.9 11.1 19.3 17.4
Transportation 6.8 6.5 7.7 7.2 6.9 6.4 6.0 6.0
Finance 0.6 0.5 0.8 1.0 0.3 0.4 6.1 8.6
Community
services
18.4 23.5 23.4 19.3 15.3 22.0 26.5 28.7
RI-South 24.2 17.2 16.5 23.0 31.3 18.4 - 10.0
RI-North 27.3 19.6 19.6 27.7 33.4 21.6 10.0 -
Source: See data appendix.
Notes: 1) South OECD countries are France, Greece, Italy and
Spain.
North OECD countries are Denmark, West Germany, Great
Britain and the Netherlands.
2) RI is the coefficient of restructuring, defined as the overall
excess employment in  sectors where the proportion
employed in the Eastern European country exceeds
employment in the comparator countries (South, respectively
North, OECD).
24
TABLE 2
Structure of employment (%) in 1994
Sector Bulgaria Czech Hungary Poland Romania Slovakia South
OECD
Agriculture 23.2 7.0 8.7 26.7 35.6 10.2 8.3
Mining 3.1 2.0 1.0 2.7 2.6 1.6 0.4
Manufacturing 29.4 29.7 23.7 20.3 24.5 26.8 20.5
Electricity, gas,
water
1.1 2.0 2.9 1.9 1.7 2.3 0.8
Construction 5.9 9.3 5.4 5.7 5.6 8.9 8.3
Trade 10.9 15.0 15.4 14.6 6.7 12.3 19.5
Transportation 7.2 7.6 8.4 5.7 5.6 7.8 6.0
Finance 1.4 1.6 1.9 1.6 0.6 1.2 7.2
Community
services
17.7 25.9 32.5 20.8 17.2 29.0 28.5
RI-South 28.2 14.6 12.7 21.8 34.4 13.6 -
Source: See data appendix.
Note: As Table 1.
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TABLE 3
Restructuring indices, 1989—1994
Speed Efficiency New Job Creation (%)
Bulgaria
Czech R.
Hungary
Poland
Romania
Slovakia
40.5            (48.2)
44.2            (39.6)
60.3            (54.5)
35.3            (44.4)
21.1            (30.5)
48.7            (48.8)
70.0            (66.8)
90.7            (87.2)
84.1            (76.0)
70.6            (64.8)
64.8            (84.2)
92.5            (90.3)
3.9
28.0
12.8
23.3
3.4
19.1
Greece*
Portugal*
26.3
70.1
57.0
85.9
41.9
89.9
*1989—1993
Source: Authors’ computations.
Note: Indices in brackets exclude agriculture.
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TABLE 4
Output, Employment and Unemployment in Central and Eastern
Europe
1989—1992 1992 1989—1995 1994
ÎGDP
%
ÎE
%
U
%
ÎGDP
%
ÎE
%
U
%
Bulgaria -26 -25 16 -25 -25 13
Czech R. -19 -9 3 -15 -9 3
Hungary -18 -21 12 -14 -26 10
Poland -17 -13 14 -3 -16 16
Romania -26 -4 8 -19 -11 11
Slovakia -21 -15 11 -16 -13 15
Source: GDP, EBRD Transition Report, pp. 185—207.
27
TABLE 5
Poland
CORRELATION BETWEEN CHANGES IN:
89—90 Employees Product price Industrial prod.
Employees 1.00
Product price 0.54 1.00
Industrial prod. 0.50 0.49 1.00
90—91 Employees Product price Industrial prod. Revenue
Employees 1.00
Product price 0.31 1.00
Industrial prod. 0.49 0.42 1.00
Revenue 0.47 0.92 0.69 1.00
91—92 Employees Product price Industrial prod. Revenue
Employees 1.00
Product price 0.67 1.00
Industrial prod. -0.09 -0.11 1.00
Revenue 0.20 0.00 0.70 1.00
92—93 Employees Product price Industrial prod. Revenue
Employees 1.00
Product price -0.04 1.00
Industrial prod. 0.27 -0.66 1.00
Revenue 0.09 0.91 -0.29 1.00
90—93 Employees Product price Industrial prod. Revenue
Employees 1.00
Product price 0.40 1.00
Industrial prod. 0.30 -0.37 1.00
Revenue 0.71 0.78 0.20 1.00
Source: Central Statistical Office
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TABLE A1
Change in employment (mil.) 1989—1992
Sector Bulgaria Czech Hungary Poland Romania Slovakia South OECD
Agriculture -0.12 -0.20 -0.36 -0.72 0.39 -0.08 -1.21
Mining -0.01 -0.07 -0.05 -0.12 0.01 0.00 0.00
Manufacturing -0.57 -0.26 -0.35 -0.89 -0.75 -0.18 -0.51
Electricity, gas,
water
0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 0.03 0.00 -0.07
Construction -0.2 0.02 -0.13 -0.26 -0.19 -0.07 0.31
Trade -0.07 0.00 0.04 0.17 0.28 -0.04 0.41
Transport -0.05 0.02 -0.03 -0.25 -0.11 0.00 0.12
Finance 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.77
Community
services
-0.07 -0.01 0.04 -0.24 -0.18 0.03 1.44
Total Change -1.08 -0.48 -0.83 -2.33 -0.50 -0.34 1.74
Job Creation
-%-
0.01
0.2
0.08
1.5
0.11
2.2
0.20
1.2
0.73
6.7
0.04
1.6
3.05
5.3
Job Destruction
-%-
-1.09
25.0
-0.55
10.2
-0.94
19.1
-2.53
14.9
-1.23
11.2
-0.38
15.2
-1.79
3.1
RI% 12.6 5.9 10.7 8.1 9.0 8.4 4.2
RI= coefficient of restructuring
Source: Author’s computations based on data sources described
in data appendix.
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TABLE A2
Change in employment (mil.) 1992—1994
Sector Bulgaria Czech Hungary Poland Romania Slovakia
Agriculture 0.06 -0.09 -0.13 0.08 0.12 -0.05
Mining 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 -0.07 -0.02 0.01
Manufacturing 0.03 -0.14 -0.17 -0.31 -0.41 -0.06
Electricity, gas,
water
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.01 0.01
Construction 0.00 0.04 -0.02 -0.23 -0.02 -0.03
Trade 0.02 0.11 -0.02 0.46 -0.26 0.02
Transport 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.13 -0.09 0.00
Finance 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.01
Community
services
-0.15 0.03 0.03 0.18 0.22 0.03
Total Change -0.04 -0.05 -0.34 0.15 -0.45 -0.06
Job Creation
-%-
0.12
3.7
0.22
4.5
0.04
0.98
0.89
6.1
0.35
3.3
0.08
3.7
Job Destruction
-%-
-0.15
4.6
-0.26
5.3
-0.38
9.3
-0.74
5.0
-0.80
7.6
-0.14
6.5
RI% 4.2 4.9 5.2 5.6 5.5 5.1
RI= coefficient of restructuring
Source: See data appendix
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TABLE A3
Bulgaria
Labour Force
Actual          Actual         Comparator
 1989             1994              country
Change in
employment
1989-94
(2)-(1)
Employment
differential
1989
(3)-(1)
Convergent Non-
Convergent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Agriculture 814 732 317 -82 -497 -82 -
Mining 114 98 15 -16 -99 -16 -
Manufacturing 1496 927 698 -569 -798 -569 -
Electricity 36 35 26 -1 -10 -1 -
Construction 333 186 258 -147 -75 -75 -72
Trade 395 344 613 -51 218 - -51
Transportation 290 227 192 -63 -98 -63 -
Finance 26 44 203 18 177 18 -
Community
services
788 558 853 -230 65 - -230
Unemployment - 537 517 537 - - -
Total 4292 3688 3688 -604 | 2037 | | 824 | | 353 |
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TABLE A4
Czech Republic
Labour Force
Actual         Actual        Comparator
 1989            1994             country
Change in
employment
1989-94
 (2)-(1)
Employment
differential
1989
(3)-(1)
Convergent Non-
Convergent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Agriculture 631 340 151 -291 -480 -291 -
Mining 197 99 30 -98 -167 -98 -
Manufacturing 1839 1444 1165 -395 -674 -395 -
Electricity 78 96 45 18 -33 - 18
Construction 392 454 292 62 -100 - 62
Trade 620 729 802 109 +182 109 -
Transportation 351 370 267 19 -84 - 19
Finance 25 78 418 53 393 53 -
Community
services
1243 1261 1310 18 67 18 -
Unemployment - 172 549 172 - - -
Total 5376 5043 5043 -333 | 2180 | | 964 | | 99 |
32
TABLE A5
Hungary
Labour Force
Actual         Actual       Comparator
 1989            1994           country
Change in
employment
1989-94
 (2)-(1)
Employment
differential
 1989
 (3)-(1)
  Convergent Non-
Convergent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Agriculture 820 328 130 -492 -690 -492 -
Mining 100 39 26 -61 -74 -61 -
Manufacturing 1408 889 998 -519 -410 -410 -109
Electricity 130 108 39 -22 -91 -22 -
Construction 345 201 251 -144 -94 -94 -50
Trade 555 578 687 23 132 23 -
Transportation 380 315 229 -65 -151 -65 -
Finance 38 73 359 35 321 35 -
Community
services
1152 1221 1123 69 -29 - 69
Unemployment 24 568 471 544 - - -
Total 4952 4320 4320 -632 | 1992 | | 1202 | | 228 |
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TABLE A6
Poland
Labour Force
Actual          Actual        Comparator
 1989             1994             country
Change in
employment
 1989-94
 (2)-(1)
Employment
differential
1989
 (3)-(1)
Convergent Non-
Convergent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Agriculture 4557 3920 1510 -637 -3047 -637 -
Mining 578 394 70 -184 -508 -184 -
Manufacturing 4173 2970 3320 -1203 -853 -853 -350
Electricity 182 276 123 94 -59 - 94
Construction 1321 839 1230 -482 -91 -91 -391
Trade 1515 2137 2916 622 1401 622 -
Transportation 1222 835 914 -387 -308 -308 -79
Finance 172 241 966 69 794 69 -
Community
services
3282 3096 4058 -236 776 - -236
Unemployment - 2910 2459 2910 - - -
Total 17002 17618 17618 616 | 7837 | | 2764 | | 1150 |
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TABLE A7
Romania
Labour Force
Actual         Actual         Comparator
 1989            1994              country
Change in
employment
   1989-94
(2)-(1)
Employment
differential
1989
(3)-(1)
Convergent Non-
Convergent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Agriculture 3056 3564 966 508 -2090 - 508
Mining 259 260 45 1 -214 - 1
Manufacturing 3613 2453 2123 -1160 -1490 -1160 -
Electricity 133 170 79 37 -54 - 37
Construction 767 561 786 -206 19 - -206
Trade 649 671 1865 22 1216 22 -
Transportation 757 561 584 -196 -173 -173 -23
Finance 35 60 618 25 583 25 -
Community
services
1677 1722 2595 45 918 45 -
Unemployment - 1224 1573 1224 - - -
Total 10946 11246 11246 300 | 6757 | | 1425 | | 775 |
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TABLE A8
Slovakia
Labour Force
Actual         Actual        Comparator
 1989            1994             country
Change in
employment
 1989-94
(2)-(1)
Employment
differential
1989
(3)-(1)
Convergent Non-
Convergent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Agriculture 345 214 74 -131 -271 -131 -
Mining 25 34 15 9 -10 - 9
Manufacturing 801 564 570 -237 -231 -231 -6
Electricity 41 48 22 7 -19 - 7
Construction 289 187 143 -102 -146 -102 -
Trade 278 258 393 -20 115 - -20
Transportation 161 163 131 2 -30 - 2
Finance 9 25 205 16 196 16 -
Community
services
549 610 642 61 93 61 -
Unemployment - 366 269 366 - - -
Total 2498 2469 2469 -29 | 1111 | | 541 | | 44 |
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TABLE A9
Greece
Labour Force
Actual         Actual        Comparator
 1989            1993             country
Change in
employment
1989-93
(2)-(1)
Employment
differential
1989
(3)-(1)
Convergent Non-
Convergent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Agriculture 930 794 354 -136 -576 -136 -
Mining 21 19 16 -2 -5 -2 -
Manufacturing 715 580 779 -135 64 - -135
Electricity 36 40 29 4 -7 - 4
Construction 239 261 288 22 49 22 -
Trade 624 792 684 168 60 60 108
Transportation 241 249 214 8 -27 - 8
Finance 169 221 227 52 58 52 3
Community
services
695 765 951 70 256 70 -
Unemployment 290 398 577 108 - - -
Total 3961 4118 4118 157 | 1302 | | 342 | | 258 |
Source: OECD- Labour Force Statistics (1993) and authors’
computations
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TABLE A10
Portugal
Labour Force
Actual         Actual      Comparator
 1989            1993           country
Change in
employment
   1989-93
 (2)-(1)
Employment
differential
1989
 (3)-(1)
Convergent Non-
Convergent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Agriculture 829 505 410 -324 -419 -324 -
Mining 20 21 19 1 -1 - 1
Manufacturing 1107 1062 902 -45 -205 -45 -
Electricity 38 31 33 -7 -5 -5 -2
Construction 384 362 334 -22 -50 -22 -
Trade 655 867 792 212 137 137 75
Transportation 180 210 248 30 68 30 -
Finance 154 310 263 156 109 109 47
Community
services
1009 1099 1102 90 93 90 -
Unemployment 300 304 668 4 - - -
Total 4677 4772 4772 95 | 1087 | | 762 | | 125 |
Source: OECD- Labour Force Statistics (1993) and authors’
computations
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TABLE A11
Spain
Labour Force
Actual        Actual      Comparator
 1989           1993           country
Change in
employment
 1989-93
(2)-(1)
Employment
differential
1989
(3)-(1)
Restructuring Non-
Restructuring
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Agriculture 1598 1198 1339 -400 -259 -259 -141
Mining 77 58 62 -19 -15 -15 -4
Manufacturing 2738 2404 2942 -334 204 - -334
Electricity 85 80 109 -5 24 - -5
Construction 1135 1090 1090 -45 -45 -45 -
Trade 2467 2485 2584 18 117 18 -
Transportation 711 700 809 -11 98 - -11
Finance 640 767 856 127 216 127 -
Community
services
2809 3044 3595 235 786 235 -
Unemployment 2900 3738 2179 838 - - -
Total 15160 15564 15564 404 | 1764 | | 699 | | 495 |
Source: OECD- Labour Force Statistics (1993) and authors’
computations
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FIGURE 1
Unemployment and new job creation in transitional economies
Source: Tables 4 and 5
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